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Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, Appellants 
Richard Taylor, John Merendino, Mark Levy, and Imaging Specialists, 
Inc. ("ISI") (collectively, "Guarantors") hereby reply to the brief 
filed by Otsuka Electronics USA, Inc. ("Otsuka"). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Guarantors have filed their Appellate Brief in which they 
assert that the court below erroneously granted summary judgment in 
favor of Otsuka and erroneously denied Guarantors' Motion for Leave 
to Amend Answer and Add Counterclaim. Otsuka's brief asserts that 
the court below correctly entered these orders and a corresponding 
judgment. However, Otsuka's brief contains numerous errors of law, 
and attempts to resolve material issues of fact which are properly 
within the realm of a trier of fact. 
Otsuka's analysis is erroneous in the following respects: (1) 
Otsuka incorrectly asserts that the Guarantors did not properly 
allege claims of fraud and a breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing, and did not raise material issues of fact with regard 
to those theories; (2) Otsuka misapplies the holding of this Court 
in Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. U.S. Rock Wool Co., 787 P.2d 
898 (Utah App. 1990), and mistakenly concludes that defenses to a 
contract never apply to concurrently executed guaranties; (3) 
Otsuka erroneously states that the Forbearance Agreement waived 
affirmative defenses; (4) Otsuka misconstrues the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding in Ona Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. nth Avenue Corp., 
850 P.2d 447 (Utah 1993); and (5) in arguing that a release waives 
I 
existing claims of fraud, Otsuka relies on cases outside this 
jurisdiction which either (a) do not stand for this proposition; or 
(b) contradict the law of this state set forth by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Oner. 
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellants and in 
this Reply Brief, the Order and Judgment of the court below should 
be reversed and this case should be remanded for a trial on the 
merits. 
II. IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW, GUARANTORS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED CLAIMS 
FOR FRAUD AND BREACH OF THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING, AND RAISED MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT IN RESPONSE TO 
OTSUKA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Contrary to Otsuka's argument (Appellee's Brief at 3 3-44), 
Guarantors sufficiently alleged claims for relief in the 
proceedings below. As asserted in Appellants' Brief at 4-13, 
significant issues existed with regard to the Otsuka MRI, including 
FDA issues and internal problems, and Otsuka knew that it could not 
deliver the Otsuka MRI or should have known that it could not make 
good faith representations that it could deliver. (R.000443-444). 
Consequently, Otsuka's representations that it would sign the 
February 1993 Lease Agreement, and therefore could deliver the 
Otsuka MRI, were misrepresentations of fact. (R.000442-443, 
000447-449). Also, Otsuka's failure to reveal the circumstances of 
the FDA problems and its internal deliberations constitute material 
omissions of fact. (R.000443-445, 000447-449, 000452-453). In 
reliance on Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions, Wasatch and 
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the Guarantors executed agreements, entered into construction loan 
contracts, and then executed an amended agreement and eventually 
the Forbearance Agreement. (R.000450). 
Guarantors also raised these genuine issues of material fact 
in their Memorandum in Opposition to Otsuka's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (Appellants' Brief at 13, R.000471-481).l 
Plaintiff's statements in footnote 6, page 40, are simply 
inexplicable. Guarantors' proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
was incorporated as Exhibit A to the Motion for Leave to Amend 
Answer and Add Counterclaim, filed October 6, 1995, which was 
signed by Guarantors' counsel pursuant to Rule 11. (R.000425-455). 
Documents attached to pleadings filed with the court are subject to 
the strictures of Rule 11. See Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 
P.2d 163, 170-172 (Utah App. 1989) (sanctions were appropriate 
where the wrong document was attached to a complaint, because 
counsel was obligated under Rule 11 to make a reasonable inquiry 
regarding the attached document before filing it); Utah Rule Civ. 
P. 11 (pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by an affida-
vit except when specifically provided by rule or statute). Thus 
pursuant to Rule 11 Guarantors' counsel certified to the court 
below that the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim was well-
grounded in fact. Guarantors could not formally file the Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim with the court because the court denied the 
motion to amend and add the counterclaim. 
Guarantors also filed on October 6, 1995: Defendants' Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment (R.000462-000464) , and Defendants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
(R.000465-491), which were supported by Affidavits of Guarantors 
Richard Taylor (R.000498-502), John Merendino (R.000580-583), and 
Mark Levy (R.000594-597) pursuant to Utah Rule Civ. P. 56(e); and 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend 
Answer and Add Counterclaim (R,000456-464) . The memoranda filed by 
Guarantors on October 6, 1995, and the proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim, each assert that plaintiff committed fraud and 
breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In order to 
avoid a wholesale repetition of facts in and a duplication of 
exhibits to each of these documents (already in excess of 22 0 
pages), the documents filed on October 6, 1995 were cross-
referenced to and supported by each other, including the 
Guarantors' Affidavits. (R.000426, 000457-458, 000463). 
3 
Furthermore, what Otsuka inaccurately characterizes as 
"erroneous, unsubstantiated and unsworn assumptions" regarding the 
FDA issues (Appellee's Brief at 43) are largely in the form of 
Otsuka's own letters and internal memoranda. The February 1, 1993 
letters to Barnes West County Hospital and DeKalb Resonance Center 
state that "there may be an issue with the FDA regarding the 
precise status" of the MRI machines and that Otsuka was "required, 
in the interim, to halt all human scanning.. ." (R.000645-655). 
Otsuka's February 5, 1993 letter to the FDA referenced a conference 
call with the FDA which "confirmed that Otsuka Electronics had 
Finally, contrary to plaintiff's puzzling assertions, the 
citations in Guarantors' Appellate Brief at 12-13 clearly set forth 
the references to Guarantors' Affidavits at R.000498-502, 000580-
583, and 000594-597, which support the assertions of fraud and 
breach of the good faith duty made in the October 6, 1995 
documents: 
Otsuka represented that it would sign the February Lease 
Agreement and failed to disclose that it was not signed 
(R.000499, 000581-582, 000595-596); 
In reliance on Otsuka's representations that it would sign the 
February Lease Agreement (which provided for the delivery of 
an Otsuka MRI), Richard Taylor entered into loan agreements on 
behalf of Wasatch, ISI, and himself personally (R.000499-500); 
Otsuka failed to disclose the FDA audit, the FDA's conclusion 
that Otsuka had committed numerous violations of FDA 
regulations, or that Otsuka had made an internal decision not 
to deliver Otsuka MRI systems (R.000500-502, 000581-582, 
000595-597); 
Otsuka's misrepresentations and omissions regarding the 
February Lease Agreement, the FDA issues, and Otsuka's 
internal decision not to ship the MRI induced reliance by 
Guarantors, who would have terminated business dealings with 
plaintiff and would not have entered into any of the agree-
ments had they known of these issues (R.000499-502, 000581-
583, 000596-597). 
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directed each of its two investigational sites...to stop all 
scanning activities using humans until further notice,11 and 
included copies of the February 4, 1993 correspondence to DeKalb 
and Barnes.2 (R.000656). Despite Otsuka's attempts to minimize 
the significance of these letters with the testimony of Kenneth 
Dennison and Dale Grant, Appellee's Brief at 42-43, Otsuka's own 
words in these letters indicate that there was obviously some 
problem with the FDA necessitating a cessation of human scanning, 
rather than simply "internal procedures,11 thus raising a factual 
dispute. 
Moreover, Otsuka does not even attempt to address the internal 
memorandum by T. Michael Henderson dated February 4, 1993 (one week 
before Wasatch and the Guarantors executed the agreements), which 
states "If the creek don't rise (and the FDA doesn't cause them to 
choke) we should have another deal done next week. And they will 
start construction — I like that stage of the deal." (R.000478, 
Addendum to Appellants' Brief). Regardless how long Otsuka ceased 
human scanning, Otsuka's own documents indicate it knew that the 
ongoing FDA issues created obstacles which would destroy a million-
dollar deal. 
2In Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief, Statement of Undisputed but 
Immaterial Facts, Otsuka fails to address the February 5, 1993 
letter to the FDA or explain why Otsuka needed to confirm to the 
FDA that it had directed the investigational sites and the Fort 
Collins site to stop all human scanning. 
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Otuska argues that the FDA issue consisted of a mere 
misunderstanding as to whether Otsuka was subject to the good 
manufacturing practices as defined in the FDA regulations at 21 
C.F.R. Part 820. (Appellee's Brief at 42-43 and Addendum 1 at 55 
1-8, 13-14). Otsuka cites the March 2, 1993 letter to Gary Dean, 
FDA Director of Compliance Branch, in which general counsel Jean 
Macheledt attempted to explain Otsuka's position. (Addendum 1 to 
Appellee's Brief at 5 8) . However, Otsuka fails to address the May 
17, 1993 Warning Letter from the FDA, in which the FDA acknowledges 
this March 2 letter as well as correspondence from Otsuka dated 
April 22 and 23 and Otsuka's statements during an April 5, 199 3 
meeting. (R.000657-658) . Notwithstanding Otsuka's explanations, 
the May 17, 1993 letter from the FDA reiterated the findings of the 
January 11-February 3, 1993 audit that the Otsuka MRI failed to 
comply with FDA regulations. The letter also stated: 
We expect your devices, prior to being used commercially 
and clinically, to be in total compliance with all 
sections of the Act, which include, but are not limited 
to, IDE, 510fk), and good manufacturing practices. 
We request that you take prompt action to correct these 
deviations. Failure to promptly correct these deviations may 
result in regulatory action being initiated by the Food and 
Drug Administration without further notice. These actions 
include seizure and/or injunction. 
(R.000658, emphasis added). 
Guarantors submit that Otuska knew, at the time of the January 
11-February 3, 1993 audit, including the problems with the FDA in 
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early February3, that the Otsuka MRI could not be used commercially 
or clinically until Otsuka complied with "all sections of the Act" 
including "510 (k) and good manufacturing practices,11 The FDA 
problems were clearly relevant and material to the transaction, and 
thus Otsuka had a duty to reveal them to Wasatch and the 
Guarantors. Rather, Otsuka chose to negotiate with Wasatch for the 
sale of the Otsuka MRI and encourage Wasatch to enter into the 
transaction, knowing that Wasatch would procure construction loans 
and begin construction4, without disclosing these obstacles. 
Otsuka coyly contends that "[a]lthough it was Otsuka's position 
that the Upgraded Model was not subject to GMPs, Otsuka determined 
that it would not ship any units of the Upgraded Model until it had 
met its own internal manufacturing standards." Addendum 1 to 
Appellees7 Brief at 5 9. Otsuka never attempts to explain what 
3The May 17, 1993 letter from the FDA refers only to the 
January 11-February 3, 1993 audit, and there were no intervening 
on-site audits. 
4Otuska asserts, Appellee's Brief at 40 fn.6, that the Otsuka 
MRI could not be shipped because Wasatch did not have an 
institutional review board (IRB) in place. There is no evidence 
that an IRB is required to accept delivery of an MRI classified as 
investigational. In light of Otsuka's delays (and eventual 
admission that it could not deliver the Otsuka MRI), it was 
entirely reasonable for Wasatch to forgo the expense of instituting 
an IRB, having already leased the MRI facility and committed to 
large construction loans, until delivery of the Otsuka MRI was 
imminent. 
Further, the March 10, 1993 letter from Dale Grant indicated 
that the Otsuka MRI would not ship until late May. (R.000631). 
Wasatch obtained the building permit on April 12, 1993, in reliance 
on the February 1993 Lease Agreement, leaving five or six weeks for 
construction before that shipment. 
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caused the "internal manufacturing problems" or why the Otsuka MRI 
did not satisfy Otsuka's "internal manufacturing standards." 
Guarantors submit that these amorphous assertions are not factually 
supported, are highly coincidental with the FDA action5, and are 
5Despite Otsuka's attempt to establish that the FDA issues were 
irrelevant, Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief, the undisputed facts 
indicate that the FDA issues were highly synchronized and 
intertwined with Otsuka's internal decision making: 
It is undisputed that Otsuka represented that it would ship 
the Otsuka MRI to Wasatch in January, 1993; the FDA commenced 
the audit of Otsuka in January, 1993, and the MRI was not 
shipped (R.000630, Addendum 1 to Appellee's Brief at 5 7); 
It is undisputed that as of one week before Wasatch and the 
Guarantors executed the agreements, Otsuka believed that the 
FDA issues could ruin the deal with Wasatch (R.000478, 
Addendum to Appellants' Brief); 
It is undisputed that on February 1, 1993, during the FDA 
audit, Otsuka directed Barnes and DeKalb to cease human 
scanning and that on February 5, 1993 Otsuka confirmed to the 
FDA that it had done so (R.000654-656); 
It is undisputed that the FDA cleared the 510(k)#2 application 
in December, 1993; shortly thereafter, Otsuka's "internal 
manufacturing controls" were satisfied, Otsuka resumed 
shipment of the MRI, and human scans were first performed 
under 510(k)#2 clearance in late December, 1993 (Addendum 1 to 
Appellee's Brief at «[ 14, R. 000721-722) . 
Moreover, it is undisputed from Otsuka's own documents and the 
testimony of Otsuka's employees that: 
At some point in 1993, Otsuka instructed its salespeople not 
to promote or sell the Otsuka MRI (R.000642-643, 000634-635); 
Otsuka believed the FDA problems would cause Wasatch "to 
choke" (R.000478, Addendum to Appellants' Brief); 
Otsuka never believed it had an obligation to deliver the 
Otsuka MRI to Wasatch (R.000609-613). 
It appears that despite Otsuka's protestations that "internal 
controls" were the reason for the decision not to ship, it was 
actually the FDA issues which arose in early 1993, before Wasatch 
and the Guarantors executed the February documents, which prompted 
Otsuka to discontinue shipping the Otsuka MRI until 510(k)#2 
clearance was obtained. These are factual issues to be determined 
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meant to divert attention from Otsuka7s failure to reveal the fact 
or very high probability that Otsuka could not deliver the Otsuka 
MRI when it negotiated the lease agreement with Wasatch. Even if 
Otsuka did experience manufacturing problems such problems would be 
irrelevant if an FDA mandate precluded production and delivery. At 
the very least, these are factual questions to be decided by a 
trier of fact. 
Otsuka further asserts that no fraud existed because 
Guarantors alleged that the inability to deliver occurred in March 
or April of 1993. (Appellee's Brief at 38.) This is incorrect. 
Guarantors alleged that it was the FDA action, which commenced in 
mid-January 1993, which "impeded or rendered impossible Otsuka's 
ability to sign and perform under the February 1993 Lease." 
(R.000443-444). Even if Otsuka made an internal decision not to 
ship Otsuka MRIs in March or April 1993, this does not preclude a 
finding of fraud. Fraud occurs when a person makes representations 
which are known to be false or are made recklessly with the 
knowledge that there are insufficient grounds to make such 
representations. Pace v. Parrish 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). 
Further, a seller has a duty to represent fairly and accurately the 
material elements of property sold when such elements are not 
easily ascertainable by the buyer and materially affect the value 
of the property. Ong, 850 P.2d at 454. Materiality of information 
by a trier of fact. 
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omitted is a question of fact for a jury. Ong, 850 P.2d at 454 fn. 
25.6 
Serious questions regarding the Otsuka MRI existed in January 
and early February 1993, yet Otsuka continued to negotiate the 
deal, and represented that it would execute the February Lease 
Agreement. As of February 4, 1993, the date of T. Michael 
Henderson's memorandum, Otsuka knew that the FDA issues would ruin 
the deal with Wasatch if the issues were revealed. A jury could 
reasonably conclude that based on the FDA's audit, conclusions, and 
warnings, Otsuka's "decision" not to ship the Otsuka MRI was merely 
a formality, and that Otsuka's representations and omissions were 
either intentionally fraudulent or made recklessly. 
Wasatch and the Guarantors agreed to accept a Siemens machine 
because at the time Otsuka finally announced it could not ship the 
Otsuka MRI, Wasatch had a lease on the MRI facility, had committed 
to substantial loans, and had begun construction on the MRI 
6Otsuka's discussion with regard to Conzelmann v. Northwest 
poultry & Dairy Products Co. , 225 P.2d 757 (Ore. 1950), must be 
qualified by these considerations. (Appellee's Brief at 36-39). 
In light of the elements of fraud in Utah, and the requirement that 
a seller reveal hidden and material facts, Otsuka had to reveal the 
facts concerning the Otsuka MRI which rendered Otsuka's ability to 
deliver substantially more difficult or improbable. There is no 
requirement, as Otsuka implies, Appellee's Brief at 37, that Otsuka 
have known with certainty that it could not deliver. 
Furthermore, Otsuka's duty to reveal these facts extended past 
the November 1992 Quotation, throughout the subsequent period 
during which the transaction was negotiated, documents were 
executed (February and August 1993), and the Guarantors procured 
financing in reliance on the transaction. 
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facility. The point of this case is that after considerable delay 
and expense (R.000484, 000499-500), Wasatch and the Guarantors 
ended up with an MRI machine which was more expensive than and had 
different technical specifications from the Otsuka MRI (R.000176-
188) , and which they did not initially bargain for. If this result 
had been the product of Otsuka,s good faith efforts to provide an 
Otsuka MRI, efforts which were frustrated because of unforeseeable 
manufacturing problems, the Guarantors would not be pursuing these 
claims and defenses. The Guarantors are pressing this appeal 
because of evidence that Otsuka either knew that it could not 
deliver an Otsuka MRI, or had good reason to know that it could not 
deliver, rendering the entire transaction a sham from its 
inception.7 Otsuka should not be able to avoid these claims and 
defenses simply because it was successful in persuading Wasatch and 
7Otsuka contends that the Motion to Amend takes a "ridiculous11 
and "absurd" position because Otsuka would not want to finance its 
competitors machine. That result was not necessarily Otsuka's 
objective. Although establishing a motive is not an element of 
fraud, the Guarantors alleged that Otsuka desired to enter into the 
transaction with Wasatch in order to develop a long-term 
relationship with the University of Utah. (R.000440, 000474). 
Further, businesses and salespeople are often zealous. Otsuka most 
likely pressed the deal with Wasatch with the hope or expectation 
that the FDA and internal issues would be resolved in time to 
deliver the Otsuka MRI. 
While Otsuka would have the Court believe that financing the 
Siemens MRI was a heroic measure, Appellee's Brief at 45-4 6, the 
Guarantors submit that Otsuka took such action because the issues 
preventing the shipment of the Otsuka MRI did not clear up, and 
Otsuka knew it would be sued if the FDA issues came to light. 
Further, the financial documents in this action demonstrate that 
Otsuka stood to earn hundreds of thousands of dollars by financing 
the Siemens transaction. (R.000131, 000175). 
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the Guarantors to accept another machine, and then to waive all 
unknown claims, all the while remaining silent with regard to the 
issues surrounding the Otsuka MRI. 
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must assume 
the facts asserted by the opposing party are true, and may not 
grant summary judgment unless it is clear that the opposing party 
could not prevail as a matter of law, Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hall 
v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226' (Utah 1983). The numerous 
questions of material fact demonstrate that the court below could 
not properly grant summary judgment for Otsuka and deny Guarantors' 
motion to amend. The rulings in this case should be reversed and 
the case remanded for trial. 
III. OTSUKA'S FRAUDULENT AND BAD PAITH BEHAVIOR/ AS ALLEGED, 
NULLIFIES THE GUARANTIES 
Otsuka cites Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. U.S. Rock Wool 
Co.
 f 787 P.2d 898 (Utah App. 1990), for the proposition that 
defenses pertaining to a primary obligor are inapplicable to a 
absolute guaranty. (Appellee's Brief at 19) . Otsuka's interpreta-
tion of Helller Western is overbroad. The defendants in Heller 
Western executed guaranties concurrently with a loan contract. 
Defendants later sought to avoid the guaranties based on 
plaintiff's bad faith conduct in performing under the loan 
contract. Heller Western, 787 P.2d at 899-901. This Court held 
that although such bad faith behavior may be a defense to 
enforcement of the loan contract, it was not pertinent to liability 
12 
under the previously executed guaranties. Heller Western, 787 P. 2d 
at 901. 
By contrast, Guarantors in the present case have alleged that 
Otsuka committed fraud and breached the good faith duty in the 
negotiation and execution of the various agreements, including the 
guaranties. (R.000447-454, 000465-481, 000499-502, 000581-583, 
000595-597). Guaranties are contracts, and are subject to general 
contract principles. Thus, if a trier of fact finds that Otsuka 
engaged in fraudulent conduct at the inception of the agreements, 
the guaranties are voidable. The holding of Heller Western is thus 
inapplicable to this case. 
IV. THE FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT IS INVALID UNDER THE UTAH SUPREME 
COURT'S HOLDING IN ONG INT'L (U.S.A.) INC. V. 11TH AVENUE 
CORP. 
The Forbearance Agreement in this case was procured by Otsuka 
without any disclosure of the misrepresentations and omissions upon 
which the original lease agreements were based. Otsuka's analysis 
of the Forbearance Agreement is in error because: (1) the plain 
language of the Forbearance Agreement does not purport to waive 
affirmative defenses, and the court below did not so rule; (2) 
pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Ong, the 
Forbearance Agreement is ineffective to waive Guarantors' fraud 
claims; and (3) Otsuka relies on cases outside this jurisdiction 
which either do not support Otsuka's position or are contrary to 
the law set forth by the Supreme Court in Ong. 
13 
A. THE FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT DID NOT AFFECT THE GUARANTORS' 
DEFENSES TO OTSUKA'S CLAIMS 
Contrary to Otsuka's statements, Appellee's Brief at 2 3-24, 
the Forbearance Agreement does not preclude the Guarantors' 
affirmative defenses. See e.g. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 
701 P.2d 795, 801 n.4 (Utah 1985) (the duty to perform a contract 
in good faith cannot be waived by either party); Hofland v. 
Gustafson. 282 P. 2d 1039 (Cal. App. 1955) (a release of claims does 
not preclude the assertion of available defenses). The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure clearly distinguish a "claim" from an 
"affirmative defense." See Utah R. Civ. P. 8. 
The Forbearance Agreement does not by its terms purport to 
waive defenses to enforcement of the underlying contracts.8 
Further, the Judgment below specifically holds that the Forbearance 
Agreement waived the Guarantors' claims, but does not state that it 
waived the Guarantors' defenses to Otuska's motion for summary 
judgment. (R.001061). While Guarantors contend that the 
Forbearance Agreement is invalid in any event under the Qng 
decision (Section IV(B) below), the defenses proffered by the 
8The Forbearance Agreement states at 5 Q: Waiver of Claims. 
Wasatch and Guarantors hereby waive and release any known or 
unknown claims, causes of action, or suits f"Claims") of any kind, 
character or nature whatsoever fixed or contingent, which Wasatch 
or Guarantors may have or claim against 0RIX or Otsuka which may 
arise out of or be connected with any acts of commission or 
omission by ORIX or Otsuka existing or occurring on or prior to the 
date of this Forbearance Agreement, including, without limitation, 
any Claims arising with respect to the Equipment Lease, Related 
Documents or the collateral or the Guaranties. (R.000157-166 
emphasis added). 
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Guarantors raised material issues of fact and precluded summary 
judgment notwithstanding the Forbearance Agreement. 
B. OTSUKA MISCONSTRUES THE FACTS AND HOLDING IN ONG 
Otsuka misinterprets Ong in several respects. (Appellee's 
Brief at 28-31) . Contrary to Otsuka's contentions, Ong does not 
require a "new misrepresentation" in connection with a release. 
(Appellee's Brief at 2 6-27).9 Rather, the fraud in Ong under the 
initial agreement and the release consisted of continuing fraud 
with regard to a single assertion; i.e. the original statement that 
the crypts were concrete, and a failure by the defendants to reveal 
that this was not true prior to the execution of the release. Ong, 
850 P. 2d at 453. At the core of the Court's decision in Ong is the 
fact that the plaintiffs would not have invested in the mausoleum 
in the first place had they known that the crypts were made of wood 
rather than concrete. Ong, 850 P. 2d at 451. Because the 
transaction in Ong was tainted from the beginning and the facts 
remained unknown to the plaintiffs, the subsequent release, which 
purported to release all existing claims of whatever source, was 
ineffective to release claims of fraud. 
9Otsuka's entire argument at pp. 26-27 of Appellee's Brief, 
citing Bellefonte Re-Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523 
(2nd Cir. 1985) and Alleghany Corp. v. Kirbv, 333 F.2d 327 (2nd 
Cir. 1964) aff'd on rehearing, 340 F.2d 311 (1965), is directly 
contrary to the holding in Ong. The decision in Ong specifically 
invalidated a release made subsequent to the underlying 
transaction, which purported to waive an unknown claim for 
fraudulent inducement of the underlying transaction. 
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Guarantors have asserted that they, like the plaintiffs in 
Ong, were induced by fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions to 
enter into a business deal: the defendants in Ong misrepresented 
what they had, while Otsuka misrepresented its ability to provide 
an Otsuka MRI, the objective of the entire transaction.10 The fact 
that Wasatch agreed to accept a Siemens MRI after several months of 
waiting and considerable expenditure does not transfigure the 
misrepresentation. Misrepresentation and omission brought Wasatch 
and the Guarantors into the transaction in the first place. 
Otsuka's faulty analysis of Ong is based on the shallow argument 
that since Wasatch knew it had a Siemens MRI at the time it signed 
the Forbearance Agreement, it cannot assert that Otsuka engaged in 
ongoing deception regarding the availability of the Otsuka MRI. 
(Appellee's Brief at 29) . Otsuka misses the point. The claims 
arise from Otsuka's inability to produce the Otsuka MRI contrary to 
its representations, not because Otsuka provided a Siemens MRI in 
lieu of an Otsuka MRI.11 
10Otsuka' s argument is that even if Wasatch and the Guarantors 
were duped into a fake business deal, their acceptance of a 
different machine and release of claims somehow validates the 
original transaction. While this argument would succeed if the 
Guarantors had been apprised at some point of the facts surrounding 
the Otsuka MRI, the failure of Otuska to ever reveal these facts 
precludes a release of fraud claims under the holding in Ong. 
nOtsuka errs in applying the exact fact situation in Ong to 
the present case rather than the rule of law set forth therein. 
Suppose the defendants in Ong had promised to provide concrete 
crypts, and in reliance on this representation the plaintiffs 
traveled from Japan and invested considerable sums in the project. 
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Otsuka also erroneously characterizes Ong as a case between 
fiduciaries not bargaining at arm's length- (Appellee's Brief at 
31) . Ong in fact concerned the adversarial termination of a 
business partnership: lf[W]hen a relationship involving partners 
becomes adversarial and the partners deal at arm's length, their 
fiduciary duties to one another may become extinguished." Ong, 850 
P. 2d at 454. The Court held that despite the termination of the 
partnership, the partners in Ong had a duty to reveal the facts 
concealed because: (1) this information had been withheld during 
the course of the partnership; and (2) a seller has a duty to 
represent fairly and accurately material elements of a transaction 
when such elements are not easily ascertainable to the buyer and 
materially affect the value of the property. Id. 
Otsuka disingenuously asserts that "Wasatch and the Guarantors 
were obliged to take reasonable steps to inform themselves and to 
protect their own interests where the underlying facts were 
reasonably within the knowledge of both parties." (Appellee's 
Brief at 31) . Like the omissions in Ong, however, all of the 
information concealed was within the knowledge of Otsuka, and none 
Defendants thereafter told plaintiffs they were unable to provide 
the concrete crypts due to commercial impossibility, and plaintiffs 
agreed to accept wooden crypts as a substitute. If defendants had 
been unable to provide the concrete crypts in the first place, and 
had made such representations intentionally or recklessly, 
plaintiffs would not have entered into the transaction (and thus 
would not have ended up with the wooden crypts) and would have a 
claim for fraud. The fraud claim is not relinquished by 
plaintiffs' acceptance of the wood crypts or a subsequent release. 
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within the knowledge of or ascertainable by Guarantors, Otsuka 
fails to enlighten the Guarantors how they could have possibly 
discovered: oral and written communication between Otsuka, the FDA, 
and Otsuka's investigational sites; an audit conducted by the FDA 
of Otsuka's Fort Collins, Colorado facility; and Otsuka's internal 
decision making and thought processes, including the conclusion 
that the FDA issue would cause Wasatch and the Guarantors "to 
choke."12 The FDA issues and internal decisions were not 
ascertainable to Wasatch, and materially affected the value of the 
Otsuka MRI. Otsuka thus had a duty to disclose these issues to 
Wasatch and the Guarantors pursuant to the rule set forth in Ong. 
C. OTUSKA RELIES ON CASES OUTSIDE THIS JURISDICTION WHICH 
EITHER DO NOT SUPPORT OTSUKA'S ARGUMENT, OR CONTRADICT 
THE LAW SET FORTH IN ONG 
The cases cited by Otsuka to support its theory that a release 
bars unknown claims of fraud13, Appellee's Brief at 21-27, should 
be disregarded for two reasons: first, many of these cases do not 
involve the concealment of facts, or are otherwise factually 
distinguishable; and second, the cases which can be construed as 
holding that a release bars unknown fraud claims are antithetic to 
the principles set forth in Ong, 
12A jury could infer wrongful intent from these documents and 
find that Otsuka's representations and omissions were thus either 
intentionally fraudulent or made recklessly. 
130tsuka does not cite a single Utah case for this proposition, 
and the opposite principle is established in Ong, which Otsuka 
misinterprets. See Section IV(B) above. 
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An examination of the following cases cited by Otsuka reveals 
that these cases actually do not involve fraud claims, or are 
otherwise inapplicable: Ingram Corp. v. J, 7av McDermott & Co. , 698 
F.2d 1295, 1314 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff failed to demonstrate 
that the defendant misrepresented or concealed facts during the 
release negotiations which would materially qualify those already 
stated); Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 599 F. 
Supp. 215, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (no party asserted fraud in the 
inducement or misrepresentation at the inception of the release); 
Ristau v. Wescold, Inc., 868 P.2d 1331, 1334 fn.5 (Ore. 1994) 
(because plaintiff conceded that the release was not fraudulently 
induced, the court specifically declined to address whether the 
release barred a claim for fraud in the inducement of the release); 
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Summit Coffee Co., 858 S.W.2d 928, 933-34 
(Tex. App. 1993) (release barred fraud claim because the release 
and underlying agreement clearly contemplated the existence of the 
undisclosed liabilities which were the basis of fraud claim); 
Meraler v. Crystal Properties Assoc, Ltd., 583 N.Y.S.2d 229, 233 
(1st Dept. 1992) (plaintiffs were fully aware of the claims at the 
time they executed the release, and there was no allegation that 
defendants attempted to conceal or misrepresent the claims). These 
cases differ substantially from the present case, in which 
Guarantors allege that Otsuka misrepresented and concealed facts 
which materially altered the transaction, and failed to reveal the 
19 
true facts throughout the parties' dealings. (R.000436-437, 
000445, 000448-450) . u 
The cases cited by Otsuka must be disregarded to the extent 
that they conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Oner. 
Although the release at issue in Ong was broad enough on its face 
to release unknown fraud claims, the Court held that the release 
was ineffective to release such claims based on the policy of Utah 
courts "of vitiating agreements, including releases, premised on 
fraud. Accordingly, a release will be voidable if it was an 
integral part of a scheme to defraud." Ong, 850 P.2d at 453. 
Cases which demonstrate a practice of upholding releases 
14Pickwick Communications, Inc. v. Weinberg, 1994 U.S. Lexis 
15680 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) is also distinguishable, as defendants in 
that case accepted the benefits of the written agreement containing 
the release, and did not bring suit against the plaintiff, for 
three years after discovering the facts constituting the alleged 
fraud. 1994 Lexis at 11-13. By contrast, Guarantors in the 
present action did not learn of the FDA issues until September, 
1995, seven months after Otsuka filed this lawsuit. (R.000500, 
000581, 000595). 
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notwithstanding unknown claims of fraud15 carry no weight in Utah 
as they are contrary to the rule set forth in Ong. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, Guarantors respectfully request 
that this Court reverse the orders granting Otsuka's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying Guarantors' Motion to Amend Answer and 
Add Counterclaim, and remand this matter for a trial on the merits. 
15Bellefonte holds that a release bars fraud claims where the 
only fraud asserted is that which also underlies the agreement 
which is the subject of the release. 757 F.2d at 52 6-27. In 
Allegheny, the court held that a release barred unknown claims of 
fraud, emphasizing that some of the facts underlying the fraud 
claim had been revealed, that the fraud gave rise to the underlying 
action, and for that fraud the defendant "paid the settlement 
price." 333 F.2d at 334. Nielson v. Beck. 1994 Lexis 15180, at 15 
involves a particularly harsh denial of a fraud claim which arose 
contemporaneously with the release in question. These decisions 
are directly contrary to the holding in Ong: that the defendants7 
failure to ever disclose the fraud in the initial transaction 
rendered the release void. Ong, 850 P.2d at 452-54. 
Other cases cited by Otsuka make broad statements which 
contradict Ong in application. In Pickwick Communications, the 
court states: "[W]e find no reason to depart from the well-
established rule that, in interpreting a release under traditional 
contract principles, we are compelled to bar claims precluded by 
the plain language of the release, including allegations of fraud." 
1994 Lexis at 13. Nielson v. Beck, 1994 Lexis 15180, 16 (D. Ore.) 
and Ristau v. Wescold, Inc.. 868 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Ore. 1994) hold: 
"[A] general release from all claims and demands is sufficient to 
bar a specific claim, unless the claim is excepted from the release 
agreement." 
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